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1. Introduction
Empirical studies demonstrate that university research has real e¤ects, enhancing inno-
vation and productivity in private rms. This works through two main channels pure
knowledge spillovers and licensing of university inventions.1 Patenting and licensing by
universities has grown sharply and has become an active public policy issue in the U.S.
From 1991-2004, patent applications by U.S. universities rose from 1,584 to 10,517 and
license income increased from $218 million to $1.4 billion, which is about six percent of
federal R&D nancing for universities.2 This rapid growth was partly associated with the
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which gave universities ownership of inventions from federally-
funded research. Today all research universities have technology licensing o¢ ces (TLOs)
and intellectual property policies.3 This paper studies how economic incentives and insti-
tutional arrangements a¤ect university technology licensing performance.
Technology transfer involves two distinct activities: innovation by faculty scientists
and commercialization by the TLO. Scientists produce both publications and inventions
in response to monetary and other incentives (e.g., promotion and tenure rules and in-
trinsic motivation).4 Lach and Schankerman (2003) show that royalty sharing incentives
for scientists strongly a¤ect innovation and licensing outcomes. The e¤ectiveness of com-
mercialization by university technology licensing o¢ ces which decide whether to patent
and license inventions, identify licensees and structure contracts is shaped by the univer-
sitys objectives, government constraints, and incentives within the TLO. Improving TLO
productivity is especially important because, under prevailing arrangements in the U.S.,
universities have monopsony control (right of rst refusal) over commercialisation.
1Leading studies on the knowledge spillovers from university research include Ja¤e (1989) and Adams
(1990). On the geographic localisation of such spillovers, see Ja¤e, Trajtenberg and Henderson, 1993; and
Audretsch and Stephan, 1996. There is also a growing empirical literature on patenting and technology
transfer by universities, and by national research laboratories (e.g., Henderson, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg,
1998; Ja¤e and Lerner, 2001; Thursby and Kemp, 2002; and Siegel, Waldman and Link, 2003).
2The gures are computed from information in the FY 2004 Licensing Survey, Association of University
Technology Managers. The patenting licensing information includes all universities and hospitals that
responded to the AUTM surveys in the respective years.
3There was some technology transfer prior to the Bayh-Dole Act, though the transaction costs and un-
certainty of property rights undermined widespread activity. For a more skeptical view of the contribution
of the Bayh-Dole Act to the growth of technology licensing, see Mowery and Zeidonis (2001).
4For discussion see Dasgupta and David (1994). Aghion, Dewatripont and Stein (2005) provide an in-
teresting theoretical analysis of the functions of university and private sector research and the implications
for incentive structures.
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A number of papers have shown that technology transfer performance is inuenced by
university characteristics and other factors, including university ownership (public versus
private), academic quality, local (high-tech) demand conditions and license contract de-
sign.(Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Thursby and Kemp, 2002; Thursby and Thursby, 2002;
Siegel,Waldman and Link, 2003; and DiGregorio and Shane, 2003; Elfenbein, 2004). These
studies explore a variety of di¤erent outcome measures, including the number of patents
and licenses, license income, and the formation of start-up companies. Our paper extends
the literature by focusing more on the black boxof productivity within the technology
licensing o¢ ce.
We focus on three key determinants of productivity: performance pay, local devel-
opment objectives, and government constraints on licensing activity. Labor economists
have studied the impact of performance pay on output and earnings in various contexts
(Lazear, 2000b, and the literature cited there). To our knowledge, this paper and Lach
and Schankerman (2003) are the only studies of how monetary incentives a¤ect perfor-
mance in not-for-prot organizations, in this case universities. Universities have various
objectives in undertaking technology transfer. Survey data used in this paper show that
the two main objectives are generating license income and promoting local and regional
development, the latter being more prominent in public universities. Institutions that view
local economic development as one of their primary functions might perform di¤erently
from those that exclusively pursue income maximization. Finally, state governments often
impose a variety of constraints both statutory restrictions and informal political pres-
sure on licensing activity in public universities. In this paper we quantify the impact of
incentives and measure the implicit cost of local development objectives and government
constraints in terms of foregone license income.
We develop a simple contracting model of the TLO that focuses on how performance-
based incentives, local development objectives and government constraints a¤ect licensing
performance. In our model, the TLO worker makes an e¤ort decision which is unobservable
to (or unveriable by) the TLO administration. This e¤ort is devoted to two things: rst,
identifying inventions with commercial potential (i.e. getting scientists to disclose them)
and, second, licensing those inventions to private rms. We assume that the interests of the
TLO and the university (administration) are aligned. However, we introduce an agency
problem by assuming that there is a divergence of interests between the TLO and its
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workers. In particular, the TLO has two objectives maximising total license income plus
a premium attached to income generated in the local market. However, workers do not
share this local development objective (they are only trying to maximise their income).
The TLO provides income sharing incentives to the worker in order to induce greater
e¤ort.
The model generates four main empirical predictions. First, the use of performance pay
should be more likely when universities give less weight to local development objectives and
are less constrained by government. Second, the use of performance pay should increase
the level of income per license (and possibly the number of licenses). Third, strong local
development objectives should reduce income per license (but possibly increase the number
of licenses). Fourth, government constraints should reduce income per license.5
We are not the rst to model the intermediation role of technology transfer o¢ ces.
Jensen, Thursby and Thursby (2005) develop a model that emphasises the dual agency
role of the TLO, which serves both university scientists and the university administration
as principals who have divergent objectives. In their model, scientists rst decide whether
(and when) to disclose their inventions, and the TLO then decides whether to search for a
licensee and negotiate terms for the license. The university administration inuences the
incentives of the TLO and faculty scientists by establishing policies for the distribution
of license income and/or industry-sponsored research. In their model, the decision of
scientists to disclose their inventions is inuenced indirectly by the e¤ectiveness of the
TLO in commercialising inventions, but the TLO does not directly invest resources to
identify inventions. Our model introduces this latter element, which the survey evidence
indicates is important.6
More recent models emphasise the role of the TLO in mitigating imperfect and asym-
metric information about the quality of inventions. Macho-Stadler, Perez-Castrillo and
Veugelers (2007) build a model in which the TLO, but not potential licensees, is informed
5While the model is based on the e¤ort e¤ect of incentives, we recognise (as emphasised by Lazear,
2000a and 2000b) that performance pay can improve productivity both by providing greater incentives
for e¤ort and by improving positive sorting of workers. The impacts of performance pay estimated in this
paper capture both e¤ects. We do not have any individual level data, and thus cannot separately identify
the pure incentive (e¤ort) and sorting e¤ects.
6According to the survey evidence, TLOs spend considerable resources to identify potentially com-
mercialisable inventions (Jensen, Thursby and Thursby, 2001). In our more recent and larger survey,
described in Section 3, TLO directors rank "identifying suitable inventions" as one of the most important
task in terms of their allocation of resources.
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about the quality of new inventions and show that reputation building in an innitely
repeated licensing game can sustain an equilibrium in which only protable inventions
are o¤ered and licensed. Finally, in an important paper, Hoppe and Ozdenoren (2005)
develop a dynamic games in which intermediaries have an incentive to invest in informa-
tion acquisition (e.g. about the quality of inventions) and use this information to match
inventions to licensees.
These papers have enhanced our understanding of the role of TLOs, but they do not
analyse the impacts of performance-based incentives and local development objectives on
TLO performance, which are the primary focus of our model. In principle, it should
be possible to build a more encompassing model that incorporates both the features we
emphasise and those in the aforementioned models, but that is beyond the scope of this
paper.
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on new survey data combined with panel
data from public sources on 86 U.S. universities for the period 1995-99. The key results
can be summarized as follows. First, universities are more likely to adopt performance
pay when they are private, when they place less weight on local development objectives
and when they are less constrained by state government. This evidence is consistent with
the predictions of the theoretical literature on the adoption of incentives in public organi-
zations.7 However, while private ownership has a large, positive e¤ect on the adoption of
incentive pay, ownership has no independent e¤ect on licensing performance, conditional
on the adoption of incentive pay. Second, incentives have strong performance e¤ects. Uni-
versities that use bonus pay generate, on average, about 30-40 percent more income per
license.8 Taken together, these two ndings suggest that it may be possible to get private
performanceout of public institutions if the right incentives are introduced.
Third, we nd that local development objectives are costlyin terms of foregone license
income. Universities with strong local development objectives generate, on average, about
30 percent less income per license. The standard argument for having a local licensing
7This literature shows that high-powered incentives are less likely to be adopted in public organizations
because of the problem of multiple principals (Berheim and Whinston, 1986; Holmstrom and Milgrom,
1988; Dixit, 1997), output measurement and monitoring (Prendergast, 2002) and stronger intrinsic moti-
vation in such organizations (Francois, 2000; Besley and Ghatak, 2006).
8This estimate is broadly similar to other estimates in the literature, including the well known study
of the productivity gains from piece work pay in an automotive glass manufacturing rm (Lazear, 2000b),
and more recent work by Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005, 2006).
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preference is that it increases localised knowledge spillovers and the agglomeration e¤ects
emphasized by the new economic geography literature. We provide some evidence that
universities with strong local development objectives are more likely to establish start-up
companies in the state rather than outside it. But a full evaluation of whether localised
spillovers are stronger for such universities in beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless,
the large opportunity cost of promoting local development through licensing highlights
the importance of comparing this policy to the alternative policy of maximizing licensing
income and using the additional income to nance local economic development in other
ways (e.g. lower business taxes or direct subsidy programs).
Finally, we nd that state government constraints reduce license income the estimated
shadow price of an additional e¤ective constraint(as dened in Section 3) is a 17 percent
reduction in license income. Universities that are more strongly constrained are also less
likely to license through new start-up companies (rather than existing rms).
The main econometric concern is the potential endogeniety of incentives due to un-
observed heterogeneity (e.g. commercial orientation) that a¤ects both the universitys
licensing performance and adoption of incentive pay. We do not have variation over time
in our measures of performance pay and thus cannot use university xed e¤ects to ad-
dress this issue. Instead, we adopt the approach developed by Blundell, Gri¢ th and van
Reenen (1999) by using information on the pre-sample license income and patenting by
the university to capture unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, we control for whether
the university is private, which should be correlated with commercial orientation. While
the pre-sample patent control is very signicant and works in the expected direction, one
cannot rule out the possibility that there is some remaining unobserved heterogeneity. To
reach more denitive conclusions, we would need information on variation over time, and
across universities, in the adoption of incentive pay as well as instrumental variables that
a¤ect that adoption decision but not license income, but this kind of information is not
available to our knowledge.
The ndings in this paper contribute to the policy debate about the e¤ectiveness of
university licensing activity, but the paper is not a cost-benet analysis of the commer-
cialisationof universities. Many scholars have expressed concerns about the potential
costs of these developments, including the threat to established norms of open science and
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the redirection of research away from fundamental science.9 While important, these issues
are beyond the scope of this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Sections 3 and
4 we describe the data and present the empirical specication. Section 5 presents and
discusses the implications of the parametric estimates of the model (nonparametric results
are included in an appendix), followed by brief concluding remarks.
2. Analytical Framework
The university technology licensing o¢ ce (TLO) hires a worker who allocates her e¤ort
to two tasks. The rst is to identify inventions with commercial potential (i.e., getting
the faculty to disclose her inventions). University scientists are contractually required
to report to the TLO any inventions based on federally-nanced research, but the survey
evidence strongly indicates that, in practice, TLO licensing o¢ cers spend substantial e¤ort
eliciting disclosures and thus increasing the "supply" of inventions (Jensen, Thursby and
Thursby, 2001; Siegel, Waldman, Atwater and Link, 2003). The second task is to search
for potential licensees and negotiate deals on those inventions. We assume that the TLO
worker makes these e¤ort decisions simultaneously.10
It takes I units of e¤ort to identify an invention with commercial potential. Each
of these disclosed invention can be licensed either in the local market (L) or the national
market (N). Licensing an invention in market i = L;N takes i units of e¤ort and
generates revenue pi. The parameter  2 [0; 1] captures the severity of any (formal or
informal) government constraints on the TLO, which have the e¤ect of reduing the payo¤
to licensing ( = 1 denotes the case of no constraints). We assume that it is more costly
to license (search) in the national market, but that it generates a higher payo¤: pN > pL
and N > 

L: We normalize the number of total inventions by faculty scientists to unity.
Let  denote the fraction of e¤ort devoted to licensing inventions in the national market.
Then total e¤ort is given by e = I+

N+(1 )L: Letting i = i +I denote the full
costof nding and licensing an invention in market i, we can write e = N + (1  )L:
9For a thoughtful analysis of these issues, see Dasgupta and David (1994). There is very limited
empirical work on the impact of such activity on open science and research orientation. Recent work
includes Agarwal and Henderson (2002) and Murray and Stern (2006).
10The predictions of the model would not change if we modelled the disclosure and licensing e¤orts of
the worker as sequential rather than simultaneous.
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E¤ort costs are C(e) = 1
2
e2:
The TLO o¤ers a compensation package involving a wage w  0 and a high-powered
incentive in the form of a fraction  2 [0; 1] of the licensing revenues.11 The TLO has two
objectives earning license income and promoting local development. License income
is R = pN + (1   )pL: We model the local development objective by assuming that
the TLO places a premium on generating license income from the local area, in addition
to the total income it retains, (1   )R: Letting p = pN   pL and  = N   L; the
objective function is
V = (1  )fp+ pLg+ (1  )pL   w (2.1)
The parameter   0 reects the premium attached to local development. Larger  denotes
a stronger local development objective.
The rst best allocation where .is contractible solves
max

V = p+ pL + (1  )pL   w s:t: U(w; ) = w   1
2
(+ L)
2  U0
where U0 is the workers reservation value. This yields
 = max

(p  pL)  L
()2
; 0

Now suppose that the TLO cannot contract over .12 The TLO sets the compensa-
tion package (w; ) subject to the incentive compatibility constraint that the worker sets
optimal e¤ort. The benet to the TLO of a higher  is that it induces more e¤ort on
high-revenue licensing. The cost is that the TLO retains less of the revenue generated.
The trade-o¤ determines the optimal :
Under incentive compatibility, the worker solves
max

U() = fp+ pLg+ w   1
2
(+ L)
2 s:t: U()  U0
=)  = max

p  L
()2
; 0

11We assume that the TLO cannot use di¤erent sharing rates for revenue raised in the local and national
markets (we have no evidence that would allow us to investigate this). We also rule out the possiibility
that the worker pays the TLO for employment (w < 0) and is compensated by revenue sharing.
12This can arise either because the workers e¤ort is not observable to the TLO or not veriable to third
parties.
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Since the worker has no preference for local development, there is a divergence between
her objectives and those of the TLO.13 Note that even if the worker retains all the license
income ( = 1);  >  as long as  > 0: If the TLO has a local development objective,
it wants to tilt e¤ort more toward licensing in the local market, relative to the allocation
made by the worker. Since we assume the TLO cannot set di¤erent revenue sharing rates
for license income in local and national markets, the only way the TLO can lower the
workers choice of  is to reduce the high-powered incentive, :
Given (); the university solves
max
;w
V = (1  )f()p+ pLg+ (1  ())pL   w
s:t: U() = f()p+ pLg+ w   1
2
(()+ L)
2  U0
Assuming the participation constraint binds, the rst order condition is
V = fp  pL   (()+ L)g
@()
@
= 0 (2.2)
which yields the optimal revenue sharing
 = max

1  pL
p
; 0

=) @

@
 0 (2.3)
The optimal revenue share for the worker is non-increasing in the weight the TLO attaches
to local development objectives.14
In the data we observe whether or not the university adopts performance-based pay,
but not the actual revenue sharing parameter, . To examine how the local development
objective a¤ects the adoption probability, suppose there is a xed cost of introducing
incentive pay, F: The TLO introduces (optimal) incentive pay if the gain exceeds the cost:
V () = V (; )  V (0; )  F; where  = (; pL; pN ; L; N ; U0). Using equation (2.2)
and recalling that  = 0 when  = 0;we get V () = 1
2
(())2: It is easy to verify
that @V ()
@
 0 and @V ()
@
 0; which imply:
13A preference for local development could arise if workers in technology licensing o¢ ces sort across
universities on this dimension.
14Two points should be noted. First, if  = 0 the TLO wants to give maximum incentives to the worker,
 = 1: However, then V > 0 only if the TLO charges the worker for the right to work (w < 0): If we rule
this out, the optimal policy is to set  < 1 that satises the participation constraint for w = 0: Second,
the optimal revenue sharing is independent of the constraint parameter  because we have assumed that
the latter a¤ects local and national licensing the same way.
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Prediction 1: Universities that care more about local development (higher ) are less
likely to adopt incentive pay.
Prediction 2: Universities that are more constrained (lower ) are less likely to adopt
incentive pay.
We next examine how incentive pay, local development objectives and constraints a¤ect
total license income earned by the university, which is what we observe in the data. With
optimal incentive pay, the license income generated is R = ()p+ pL: The e¤ect
of adopting (optimal) incentive pay is given by R = R(; ) R(0; ) = ()p > 0:
This leads to:
Prediction 3: Universities which use incentive pay generate greater license income per
license.
Finally, using the expression R = ()p + pL and equation (2.3), it is easy to
verify that @R

@
 0 and @R
@
 0; where these derivatives take into account the impact
of  and  on the optimal revenue sharing decision, : These results imply the following
two predictions:
Prediction 4: Universities that care more about local development (higher ) generate
less license income per license, conditional on their choice of whether to adopt incentive
pay.
Prediction 5 : Universities that are more constrained (lower ) earn less license income
per license, conditional on their choice of whether to adopt incentive pay.
In the model above, we have interpreted the local development objective as a preference
for generating license income in the local market. A plausible alternative interpretation
of a local licensing preference is that the university (TLO) may attach a premium to the
number of licenses it generates in the local market, rather than the amount of license
income in the local market.15 To analyse this interpretation, we can re-write the objective
function for the TLO as
15In the survey, 52 universities rank the number of licenses as a very important objective, 24 as moder-
ately important and 10 as relatively unimportant or unimportant (the survey does not distinguish between
local and non-local in this respect). The average shares of non-exclusive in total licenses for these groups
of universities are, repectively, 88, 82 and 68.
10
V = (1  )fp+ pLg+ (1  )  w (2.4)
Here the local objective component is the term (1   ); as compared with the original
formulation in equation (2.1) in which it was (1 )pL: Following the derivations above,
it is straightforward to show that Predictions 1-5 continue to hold with this new objective
function. However, we obtain an additional prediction with this new formulation: the
number of licenses in the local market, denoted by (1 ); increases when incentive pay is
used, when local development objectives are stronger (higher ); and when constraints are
more severe (lower ). We will investigate these additional implications in the empirical
analysis in Sections 4 and 5.
3. Data Description
This paper combines data from three main sources: (1) a new survey of technology licensing
o¢ ces in public and private universities in the United States, (2) annual surveys published
by the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM), and (3) patent data from
the USPTO (available at the NBER archive).
Survey: We conducted a survey of TLO directors in late 2003. The survey was sent
to about 200 U.S. and Canadian research universities that belong to the AUTM, from
which we received 102 responses. After matching to other data for the empirical analysis,
the nal sample consists of 86 universities. We ran sample selection regressions using
as controls the sample mean of TLO age, TLO size, license income per active license,
number of licenses executed per invention disclosure, and dummy variable for whether
the university is private and whether it has a medical school. Only the medical school
dummy has a signicant (positive) coe¢ cient in the selection equation (pseudo-R2 = :13,
p-value<.001). Importantly, the response probability is not systematically related to the
private status of the university or either of the two measures of licensing performance
which we later use in the econometric analysis.
In addition to descriptive information about the TLO, the survey focused on three
key areas: (1) the use of performance-based pay (merit pay or bonuses), (2) the relative
importance of di¤erent objectives in their licensing activity, and (3) informal and formal
11
government constraints on TLO operations.16
On incentives, the survey asked whether the TLO uses some form of performance-based
pay for its professional sta¤either merit pay or bonuses. We dene a dummy variable for
the TLOs that use merit pay and another for bonus pay. These indicators of performance-
based pay include both cases where the pay is based on subjective and objective measures
of performance, and on the basis of individual or group performance.17 Bonuses are a more
high-powered incentive because they are more directly linked to objective performance
outcomes. We do not have any information on the size of performance-related pay.
On objectives, the survey asked to assess the importance of di¤erent objectives of the
TLO (as very important, moderately important, relatively unimportant or unimportant).
These objectives include (but are not limited to) the number of licenses executed, the
amount of license income generated, and the promotion of local and regional economic
development (i.e., a preference for licensing to local rms, even if it does not maximize
licensing revenue). Inspection of the survey data shows that the only objective for which
universities di¤er substantially is local and regional development.18 For this reason, we fo-
cus our attention in this paper on this objective. We dene a set of dummy variables that
reect the importance of the local development objective: LOCDEV=High (very impor-
tant) and LOCDEV=Medium (relatively important); the reference category corresponds
to relatively unimportantor unimportant.
Finally, the survey asked about the importance of six di¤erent (formal or informal) con-
straints on licensing operations that are imposed by state government, using the same de-
scriptions as for local development objectives. The constraints cover the choice of licensees,
license contract terms, the use of equity stakes (rather than royalties), and provisions re-
garding condentiality, indemnication and dispute resolution. We dene a variable that
counts the number of constraints for which the TLO reports moderately importantor
16The survey questionaire is available from the authors on request.
17For a theoretical analysis of incentives based on objective and subjective performance measures, see
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994). Our survey contains some information on these two characteris-
tics, but the data were not rich enough to allow us to di¤erentiate performance-based pay along these
dimensions
18For the local development objective, 29 universities rank it as very important as compared to 20
who say that it is relatively unimportant or unimportant (the rest rank it as moderately important). By
contrast, for the number of licenses executed, 51 universities rank it as a very important objective and
only 10 say that it is relatively unimportant or unimportant. This latter characterization also holds for
the other objectives in the survey.
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very important. We have no information when these constraints were introduced.
AUTM: Data on licensing income, the number of new licenses executed, the stock of
active licenses, the number of inventions disclosed, and descriptive information about the
TLO (size and age) and the university are taken from the Annual Surveys of the Associ-
ation of University Technology Managers (AUTM). The AUTM surveys cover the period
1991-2001, but for the set of variables we need the usable sample period is 1995-2001.19
The nal data set is an unbalanced panel of 521 observations covering 86 universities. The
AUTM data are at the university level aggregated across technology elds; there is no
information for separate technology areas or for individual innovations.
USPTO: For each university we construct a pre-sample measure of the stock of
patents held by each university as of 1990. We use this measure to capture unobserved
heterogeneity that may be due to variations across universities in their commercial ori-
entation or capacity. To construct the pre-sample patents, we matched the names of
universities in our sample to the complete list of assignees to any patent applications led
(and subsequently issued) in the USPTO during the period 1969-1990.
Technology composition of faculty: We collected information from the National Re-
search Council (part of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences) on the distribution of
faculty across hard science departments in order to construct measures of university spe-
cialization in di¤erent research areas.20 This information is provided only for U.S. univer-
sities. For Canadian institutions we constructed a measure of the faculty size by hand,
using the lists of full time faculty for each of the 23 hard science departments covered
by the NRC, as provided on the university websites, and then aggregated up to the six
categories used in this paper.
High-tech density (TechPole index): We measure high-tech density (to proxy the local
19Information on the stock of active licenses (which generate observed license income) is only available
for the subperiod 1995-2001. Also note that licensing income includes all license fees, running royalties,
and the cash value of equity when sold.
20The NRC provides full-time faculty size for 23 di¤erent doctoral programs, which we aggregate into
six science elds. We use the shares of faculty employed in each eld to proxy for the research orientation
of the university. The elds are: (1) Biomedical and Genetics (biochemical/molecular biology, cell and
development biology, biomedical engineering and molecular and general genetics), (2) Other Biological
Sciences (neurosciences, pharmacology, physiology and ecology/evolution and behavior), (3) Computer
Science, (4) Chemical Science (chemistry and chemical engineering), (5) Engineering (aerospace, civil
engineering, electrical engineering, industrial engineering, material science, and mechanical engineering),
and (6) Physical Sciences (astrophysics/astronomy, geosciences, mathematics, oceanography, physics, and
statistics/biomedical statistics).
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demand for licensing) by the TechPole index, constructed by the Milken Institute (Devol
and Wong, 1999). The index a composite of the share of national high-tech real output
and the concentration of high-tech industries for each U.S. metropolitan area. The index
ranges from zero to a maximum value of about 23 for Silicon Valley. We assign each
university the index for the metropolitan area nearest to the university location (main
campus). For the Canadian universities, we use a ranking of the high-tech density of U.S.
and Canadian cities and assign each Canadian university the average TechPole index for
the next highest and lowest U.S. cities in the ranking.21
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample. Table 2 provides more detailed
information about how the key survey variables vary with university ownership, size, and
high-tech density. Note rst that the use of high-powered incentives is strongly linked
to ownership private universities are much more likely to use some form of incentive
pay than public institutions. Incentives are also more common in larger TLOs (where
direct monitoring of performance is likely to be more di¢ cult), and in universities lo-
cated in high-tech areas. Second, private universities are much less likely to pursue local
development objectives than public ones, but this does not vary with TLO size or high-
tech density. Third, government constraints are important only for public universities (no
private university reports more than two constraints being important).
[See Tables 1 and 2]
These facts have two further implications linked to the models predictions. First,
universities that attach low weight to local development objectives (LOCDEV=Low) are
twice as likely to adopt the highest powered incentive (bonus pay), as compared to uni-
versities with strong development objectives (LOCDEV=High)  21 versus 10 percent,
respectively. Second, universities that are less constrained by government regulations
(NumConst< 3) are twice as likely to adopt bonus pay as compared to more constrained
universities (NumConst 3) 20 versus 10 percent, respectively. These simple results are
consistent with Predictions 1 and 2 of the model.
To investigate further, we conduct Probit estimation of the determinants of adopting
bonus incentives (Table 3). We start with a specication that includes only a private
21The ranking was taken from Competing on Creativity, A Report prepared for the Ontario Ministry
of Entrerprise, Opportunity and Innovation and the Institute for Competitiveness and Prosperity (
November 2002), by Mric Gertler, Richard Florida, Gary Gates and Tara Vinodrai. Downloaded from
www.creativeclass.org/acrobat/jan2003_canada.pdf
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ownership dummy, which is positive and signicant. The coe¢ cient on the private owner-
ship dummy is robust to adding controls for observed heterogeneity (column 2), and the
implied e¤ect of university ownership is large moving from public to private doubles the
probability of using bonus pay (from the mean of 35 to 71 percent). This nding that
ownership strongly a¤ects the adoption of incentive pay is robust to adding pre-sample
patenting to control for unobserved heterogeneity (column 4).22 However, it is not possible
to disentangle the separate e¤ect of private ownership from those of local development ob-
jectives and constraints because of the strong correlation among these variables (column
5). If we drop the private ownership dummy (column 5), we nd that incentive pay is
negatively and signicantly associated with the number of government constraints, but
not with local development objectives. This supports Prediction 2, but not Prediction 1,
of the model.
[See Table 3]
Before turning to the econometric analysis, we present nonparametric evidence linking
incentives, local development objectives and constraints to licensing performance. Figures
1 and 2 present smoothed cumulative distribution functions of income per active license
and the number of licenses per invention disclosed (averaged over time) for universities
grouped according to whether they use bonus incentives, the strength of local development
objectives, and the severity of government constraints. It is clear that the distribution
of income per license for universities that use bonus pay stochastically dominates the
distribution for those that do not. This also very nearly holds for universities that are less
constrained and that place less weight on local development. The e¤ects of bonus pay and
constraints are less clear-cut for the number of licenses per invention, but there is some
evidence that stronger local development objectives are associated with more licenses per
invention. The next sections provide an econometric analysis of these relationships.
[See Figures 1 and 2]
22In sharp contrast, we show in Section 5 that private ownership does not have any independent e¤ect
on licensing outcomes, once we control for the use of incentive pay.
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4. Empirical Specication
4.1. License income equation
The baseline specication links licensing income to incentives, local development objectives
and constraints, as follows:
log(LicInc)it = 
I
0 + 
I
1 log(LicExec)it + 
I
2DumMeriti + 
I
3DumBonusi
+I4LOCDEV_Medi + 
I
5LOCDEV_Highi + 
I
6NumConsti(4.1)
+I7Intervene  NumConsti + Z 0itI +  It + Iit (4.2)
where the superscript I refers to the license income equation, and i and t denote university
and year, respectively. The variables are dened as follows: LicInc is the annual ow of
licensing income, LicExec is the cumulative number (stock) of active licenses held by
the TLO, DumMerit is a dummy variable that equals one if the TLO uses merit pay,
DumBonus is a dummy variable that equals one if the TLO pays bonuses as part of
the compensation scheme, LOCDEV_Med and LOCDEV_High are dummy variables
denoting medium and strong local development objectives of the TLO (the reference
category is no/weak objectives), Numconst is the number of constraints the TLO reports
as important or very important, Intervene is a dummy variable equal to one if the TLO
reports that the university frequently intervenes in its decision-making, Z is a vector of
additional controls,  It is a complete set of year dummies, and 
I
it is an error term. The
control variables include the share of faculty in di¤erent elds of research, dummies for
whether the university is private or public and whether it has a medical school, pre-
sample patents and others.23 The equation is estimated by generalized least squares with
standard errors that allow for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and rst-order serial correlation
(AR(1)).24
Based on the analysis in Section 2, we expect the following signs for the coe¢ cients of
interest (prediction from the model): I3 > 
I
2  0 (Prediction 3), I5 < I4 < 0 (Prediction
4), and I6 < 0 (Prediction 5). Finally we expect 
I
7 > 0 if the university intervenes to
23In some specications we also control for the number of inventions disclosed (by the faculty) to the
university TLO in order to capture the size of the available poolof inventions that can be licensed.
24We also estimated the equations using a more general error specication, allowing AR(2) with arbi-
trary heteroskedasticity. The estimated parameters and standard errors are very similar.
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mitigate the e¤ect of government constraints. This would be expected if the university
and TLO have aligned objectives, as assumed in the model.
On nal point should be noted on the interpretation of the coe¢ cients I2 and 
I
3: As
emphasized by Lazear (2000a, 2000b), performance based pay can improve performance
both by providing greater incentives to existing workers to increase e¤ort and by improving
positive sorting (higher productivity workers moving to TLOs that o¤er performance pay).
The coe¢ cients on the merit and bonus pay dummy variables capture both e¤ects. Since
we do not have individual-level data, we cannot separately identify the pure incentive
(e¤ort) and sorting e¤ects.
There is a concern that the estimates of I2 and 
I
3 may be upward biased by unobserved
heterogeneity, e.g. di¤erences in commercial orientation (This also applies to the equation
for the number of licenses below). Because we do not have variation over time in incentive
pay, we cannot use university xed e¤ects here. We adopt the pre-sample scalingap-
proach developed by Blundell, Gri¢ th and Van Reenen (1999) and Blundell, Gri¢ th and
Windmeijer (2002). They show that, under the assumption that the unobserved xed ef-
fect can be expressed as a linear function of the observable characteristics, the pre-sample
mean of the dependent variable is a su¢ cient statistic for the unobserved xed e¤ect.
Thus one can use this pre-sample mean as an additional regressor to control for such het-
erogeneity. In our context, this involves using the pre-sample mean of license revenues to
control for unobserved, university xed e¤ects. We use the mean license income for the
period 1991-94 for each university as a control in the regression on the 1995-99 sample.
Because of missing observations, we have only 66 universities in this exercise. Therefore,
we also use pre-sample data on patenting by each university for the period 1965-90 (both
patent counts and citations), which is available for the full sample of 86 universities.25 Lach
and Schankerman (2007) show that pre-sample information on patenting can be used in
place of pre-sample information on license income, provided we assume that patenting is
also a linear function of the same unobserved heterogeneity that a¤ects license income,
which seems very reasonable (see Appendix 2 for details). Finally, we include a dummy
variable for whether the university is private or public, since ownership type is likely to
25We actually use the log of one plus the number of patent counts, so as not to discard universities
with zero pre-sample patents, and add a dummy variable for these observations. It is worth noting that
the within-sample (1995-99) correlation between the log of patent counts and the log of license income is
high, at 0.67.
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be correlated with commercial orientation.
4.2. Number of licenses equation
The baseline specication links the annual ow of licenses executed by the TLO to incen-
tives, objectives and constraints, as follows:
log(Licenses)it = 
N
0 + 
N
1 log(Inventions)it + 
N
2 DumMeriti + 
N
3 DumBonusi
+N4 LOCDEV_Medi + 
N
5 LOCDEV_Highi + 
N
6 NumConsti
+N7 Intervene NumConsti + Z 0itN + Nt + Nit (4.3)
where the superscript N refers to the number of licenses equation. Following the model, we
summarize the parameter predictions as follows. First, we expect high powered incentives
to improve performance, so N3 > 
N
2  0: Second, it is easier for the TLO to monitor
the number of licenses a worker generates (from a given stock of inventions), as compared
to the license income generated relative to what might have been earned by more e¤ort.
Because of this di¤erence, we expect the adoption of any form of incentive pay to have a
smaller impact on the number of licenses than on the level of license income: N2 < 
I
2 and
N3 < 
I
3: Finally, we expect the impact of local development objectives on the number
of licenses is likely to be positive rather than negative. Universities that care about local
development are more likely to license inventions non-exclusively which generates less
license income but a larger number of licenses on the available inventions. The survey
evidence conrms this conjecture.26 Thus we expect N5 > 
N
4  0:
4.3. Start-ups equations
We use two equations, one for the number of university startup companies and a second
for the location of those startups. Since the number of startups is a count variable, we use
a negative binomial specication for both equations. The rst links the expected number
(annual ow) of university start-ups to the ow of licenses executed, incentives, objectives
and constraints:
26For the sample as a whole, exclusive licenses account for 64.7 percent of all licenses executed, but the
ratio di¤ers signicantly with the strength of local development objectives. For universities that do not
care at all about local development (LOCDEV=Low), the ratio is 68.1 percent (s.e.=0.19). For universities
with a moderate local development objective (LOCDEV=Medium), the share is 66.4 (s.e.=0.22), and for
those with strong objectives, it is 60.2 (s.e.=0.23).
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E(Startups)it = 
S
0 + 
S
1 log(Licenses)it + 
S
2 log(Inventions)it + 
S
3DumMeriti
+S4DumBonusi + 
S
5LOCDEV_Medi + 
S
6LOCDEV_Highi
+S7NumConsti + Z
0
it
S + St + 
S
it (4.4)
Startups are one mode of licensing (the other is to existing rms). There is no reason
that high-powered incentives should a¤ect the choice of licensing mode. The same holds for
local development objectives, since a local licensing preference can be pursued with either
licensing mode. Thus we expect S3 = 
S
4 = 
S
5 = 
S
6 = 0: However, licensing to startups
is typically much more risky than licensing to existing rms. Since the survey indicates
that restrictions on indemnication and dispute resolution are the most frequently cited
as importantconstraints, we expect that more constrained universities will be less likely
to license via startups S7 < 0:
The second equation links the expected number of university start-ups established
in the state where the university is located to the number of total start-ups, incentives,
objectives and constraints:
E(LocalStartups)it = 
L
0 + 
L
1 log(Inventions)it + 
L
2Start psit + 
L
3DumMeriti
+L4DumBonusi + 
L
5LOCDEV_Medi + 
L
6LOCDEV_Highi(4.5)
+L7NumConsti + Z
0
it
L + Lt + 
L
it (4.6)
There is no reason to believe that incentives should a¤ect the locational choice of
startups, thus we expect L3 = 
L
4 = 0:.However, strong local development objectives
should create a preference for local (relative to out-of-state) startups, so L6 > 
L
5 > 0:
Finally, since government (statutory) restrictions do not typically discriminate between
in-state and out-of-state licensees, we expect L7 = 0:
27
Table 4 summarizes the qualitative predictions of the key variables of interest.
[See Table 4]
27If there is informal government pressure to license to local rather than out-of-state startups, then
L7 > 0:
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5. Econometric Results
5.1. License income
Table 5 summarizes the results for the license income equation. In all regressions we control
for the stock of active (non-expired) licenses, so the coe¢ cients in this equation essentially
refer to the determinants of the income per license  i.e., the quality of licenses. As
column 1 shows, private universities generate higher income per license (about 30 percent
more) than public universities. In column 2 we add dummy variables for the use of merit
pay and bonuses (the baseline category is no incentive pay). The coe¢ cients indicate that
incentive pay strongly a¤ects license income and, as expected, the impact increases with
the strength of the incentive. While the point estimates of both coe¢ cients are positive,
the e¤ect of bonuses is more than twice as large as for merit pay. We show below that
the estimated e¤ects of incentives decline, but remain signicant, when we control for
observed and unobserved heterogeneity across universities. Importantly, the coe¢ cient on
the private dummy is no longer signicant once we include the incentive pay variables.
That is, private ownership a¤ects licensing performance only because it is correlated with
the adoption of high-powered incentives.
[See Table 5]
To control for observed heterogeneity across universities, in column 3 we introduce
variables to pick up di¤erences both on the supply and demand sides of the licensing
activity. First, we use two controls for the technological orientation of research at the
university a dummy variable for whether the university has an a¢ liated medical school,
and the shares of the full-time faculty in each of six technology areas (biomedical, other
biological, chemistry, computer science, engineering and physical sciences). Second, to
pick up di¤erences in the local demand for licenses we include a measure of the high-tech
density of the city in which the university is located the TechPole index.
Introducing these controls for heterogeneity reduces the coe¢ cients on incentive pay,
as one might expect. The use of merit pay no longer has any e¤ect on license income.
However, while the coe¢ cient on the high powered incentive bonuses  is reduced by
about half as compared to column 2, the estimated e¤ect is still large and statistically
strong. With these additional controls, the use of bonuses is associated with about a 40
percent increase in license income. The controls for technology orientation and demand are
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also signicant. The coe¢ cient on the medical school dummy is very large, reecting the
commercial importance of biomedical research in universities. The estimated coe¢ cient
on the TechPole index conrms that local demand is also important. To illustrate the
quantitative implications, the point estimate implies that moving a university from Iowa
City to Chicago would be associated with a 12.2 percent increase in income per license
[(3:75   0:063)  0:033]; moving it to Boston would further increase income per license
by 8.4 percent [(6:31   3:75)  0:033]. The fact that local high-tech density matters is
interesting because it is suggests that information and/or transaction costs of licensing
are related to geography.28
Finally, we control for potential correlation between the adoption of incentive pay and
unobserved university heterogeneity. As discussed in Section 4.1, we adopt the approach
developed by Blundell, Gri¢ th and van Reenen (1999), which involves using the pre-
sample mean of license revenue for each university as an additional regressor to control
for such heterogeneity. As discussed earlier, because we have a very short pre-sample
time series on license revenues (only 1991-94), we primarily use pre-sample information
for 1965-90 on patenting by the university (both patent counts and citations). The results
are provided in column 4 of Table 5. The coe¢ cient on the pre-sample patents variable is
positive and highly signicant. Adding the pre-sample control to the regression reduces
the estimated e¤ect of bonus pay, from 0.40 to 0.30, indicating that correlated unobserved
heterogeneity is in fact present, but the coe¢ cient remains strongly signicant. We also
try controlling for unobserved heterogeneity by including the average income per invention
disclosure over the period 1991-94 (the regression covers the sample period 1995-99). This
reduces the available sample from 86 to only 66 universities (column 5), but using this
control gives similar results to those obtained using the pre-sample patents. Since ours is
the rst attempt to estimate the incentive e¤ect of performance-based pay in universities,
we cannot make any direct comparisons to previous research. But it is reassuring that
our estimated incentive e¤ect of bonus pay is very similar to the productivity impact
of introducing piece-work pay (in automobile windshield installation) in the well-known
28The di¤erences in licensing performance are not due to di¤erences across universities in the geographic
scope of their search for licensees. The survey asks how widely the TLO typically searches in the local
area, state, nation or globally. The vast majority of universities resport that they search either nationally
or globally.
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study by Lazear (2000b).29
We next use the survey evidence on the importance the TLO attaches to local de-
velopment objectives (LOCDEV) in its licensing activity. The model predicts that such
objectives will be associated both with a lower probability of adopting incentive pay and,
at the same time lower levels of license income, conditional on whether or not incentive pay
is used. Column 5 presents the specication that includes dummy variables for medium
and strong local development objectives. As expected, universities that care most strongly
about promoting local development generate less licensing income, and the e¤ect is large
on average, they earn nearly 30 percent less income per license. Controlling for local
development objectives marginally reduces the e¤ect of using bonus pay (from 0.30 to
0.27), but the decline in the estimated coe¢ cient is not statistically signicant.
In column 6 we add the number of government constraints that the TLO reports are
either important or very important (maximum of six constraints) which we will call
e¤ective constraints and the interaction between this variable and a dummy variable for
whether the university (administration) frequently intervenes in the decision-making of
the TLO. If the interests of the university and the TLO are aligned, as we assumed in the
theoretical model, then university intervention should reduce the negative e¤ect of gov-
ernment intervention on licensing performance. Otherwise, university intervention should
worsen TLO performance. The results conrm that government constraints strongly a¤ect
performance. The e¤ect of adding another e¤ective constraint is to reduce license income
by 17 percent. The median number of such constraints in the sample is 1.6, which implies
a reduction in license income of 27 percent.30 However, there is clear evidence that uni-
versity intervention mitigates the impact of government constraints (perhaps because the
university can help circumvent informal government intervention) as shown by the point
estimate of 0.279 on the interaction term. For universities that intervene, the implied
marginal e¤ect of government constraints is not signicantly di¤erent from zero (the point
estimate is  0:171 + 0:279 = 0:108 with a standard error of 0.029).
In all of these specications, we have controlled for the number of active licenses. How-
ever, if licensing is done from a larger pool of inventions, we would expect a higher average
29Using detailed worker-level data, Lazear (2000b) found that moving from hourly to piece-work pay
increased average labor productivity by 44 percent, about half of which was due to increased productivity
for existing workers and the other half to positive sorting and other factors.
30The minimum number of important constraints reported in the sample is zero; the maximum is six.
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level of license income to be generated.31 To allow for this possibility, in column 7 we add
the log of the number of faculty inventions (disclosed to the TLO). The estimated coe¢ -
cient is positive and signicant, consistent with the hypothesis that there are diminishing
returns to licensing from a given pool of inventions. Adding the number of inventions does
not a¤ect the size of the coe¢ cients on the bonus pay or local development variables. The
e¤ect of government constraints is reduced and loses statistical signicance, however.
5.2. Number of Licenses
Table 6 presents the results for the annual number of licenses executed per year. In all
these regressions, we control for the annual number of inventions disclosed, so the other
coe¢ cients in the equation essentially refer to the impact on licenses per invention.32
[See Table 6]
A number of interesting ndings emerge. First, unlike in the regressions for license
income, private ownership has no signicant e¤ect on the number of licenses generated
from a given pool of inventions (column 1). This nding continues to hold when we intro-
duce various controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity (columns 2-6). Second,
incentives do not have a statistically signicant e¤ect on the quantity of licenses, once we
control for heterogeneity (columns 3-6). This is striking, since we found strong impacts
of bonus pay on income per license. This di¤erence is likely due to the fact that it is
relatively easy to monitor a TLO workers performance in quantityterms how many
licenses are generated from a given number of inventions but very di¢ cult to evaluate
performance in terms of license income because the potential value of each invention is
not known ex ante by the TLO management.33
The third nding is that local development objectives have a positive and signicant
impact on the number of licenses generated, which is the opposite sign from their impact
31This argument assumes that the distribution of potential value of inventions is the same. Our controls
for technological specialisation of the faculty and the medical school dummy should help capture di¤erences
in value distributions. We also tried adding various measures of faculty quality, such as publications and
citations per faculty (taken from the National Research Council), but these variables did not have any
signicant e¤ect on license income in the regressions.
32We also included the size of the TLO (full-time professionals), but it was never statistically signicant
once we control for the number of inventions from the faculty.
33In Appendix 1 we nd that when non-parametric estimation techniques are used, high-powered incen-
tives (bonus pay) do have a positive and signicant e¤ect on the number of licenses. But the quantitative
e¤ect is much smaller than for license income, which is again consistent with the monitoring argument
made in the text.
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on the level of income per license. Universities with medium local development objectives
generate, on average, 12 percent more licenses than those with no such objectives; for
strong local development focus, the increase in 28 percent. This probably reects the fact
that strong local development focus is associated with more concern for maximizing the
number of licenses rather than license income, as evidenced by greater use of non-exclusive
licenses by universities with such objectives.
Fourth, as column 6 shows, government constraints do not have a signicant impact
on the number of licenses generated. This is in sharp contrast to the signicant and large
negative impact of such constraints on the income generated per license. This indicates
that government constraints impinge on the universitys ability to nd the most suitable
licensee match (from their perspective), but not to license per se.
Finally, our controls for heterogeneity in university characteristics are important de-
terminants of the number of licenses per invention. First, the research orientation of the
university, as measured by faculty shares in di¤erent technology areas, signicantly a¤ects
licensing. Second, the high tech density of the university location (TechPole) conrms that
the local demand for licenses a¤ects the ability of the TLO to strike deals. Interestingly,
the point estimates of the TechPole coe¢ cients in the licenses executed equation are almost
identical to those in the license income equation i.e., local demand has essentially the
same impact on the quantity and quality dimensions of licensing performance. Finally, we
nd that universities with medical schools generate, on average, about 11 percent fewer
licenses per invention, whereas we found that they generate about 50-70 percent more
income per license.
The key ndings for the license income and number of licenses equations also hold
when we use non-parametric (propensity score matching) estimation techniques. Details
are provided in Appendix 1.
5.3. Number and Location of Startups
Table 7 summarises the estimates for the number and location of start-ups. The results
are strongly consistent with our predictions. Turning rst to the number of startups,
we nd that incentives and local development objectives have no signicant e¤ect on the
choice of licensing mode i.e., on the number of startups, conditional on the number of
new licenses executed. Second, universities which are more strongly constrained generate
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fewer startups, which is consistent with the greater risk of start-ups relative to licensing to
existing rms. Third, private universities license less to startups than public institutions,
other things equal. It may be that startups are a more visible metric of activity for
public universities. On the location of startups, we nd that incentives and government
constraints do not a¤ect the choice of location (conditional on licensing to a startup), but
local development objectives, and public ownership of universities, are strongly associated
with the likelihood that an in-state startup will be licensed.
[See Table 7]
5.4. Potential Bias from Mismeasuring Local Development Objectives
Our survey measure of the strength of local development objectives is likely to contain
measurement error (call it ") for two main reasons. First, the measure is subjective and,
while using categories rather than a continuous measure of importancemay mitigate
reporting error, it is unlikely to eliminate it. Second, it may be hard for TLO directors
to distinguish between behaviour that reects their own local development objectives as
opposed to government pressure and constraints to license locally. We now examine how
such measurement error is likely to a¤ect our empirical ndings.34
If we make the standard assumption that measurement error is uncorrelated with ei-
ther observed covariates or unobserved university heterogeneity (commercial orientation,
call it ); then attenuation bias implies that we will understate the e¤ect of local develop-
ment objectives (LOCDEV). In particular, we will underestimate their negative impact on
license income and underestimate their positive impact on the number of licenses. Such
biases would strengthen, rather than undermine, our conclusions.
However, in our context it may be plausible to assume that measurement error is corre-
lated with unobserved university heterogeneity. The reason is that such mismeasurement
may actually reect real di¤erences across universities in their local licensing preferences
which our survey measure does not capture, rather than random reporting error. These
unobserved di¤erences in true local development objectives are likely to be negatively cor-
related with the commercial orientation of the university, " < 0:35 In this case, we get
34We focus on the e¤ects of measurement error in our survey variable on local development objectives,
but the arguments also apply to our measure of government constraints.
35Recall that the obsserved survey measure of LOCDEV is lower for private universities, which we
expect to be more commerically oriented than public institutions (see Table 2).
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two sources of bias but they reinforce each other standard attenuation bias and the neg-
ative bias induced by the correlation between " and : In addition, it is possible that the
observed survey measure itself may be correlated (negatively) with the unobserved uni-
versity heterogeneity. This endogeneity would also cause us to under-estimate the e¤ects
of LOCDEV on both license income and number of licenses.36
We can test whether unobserved university heterogeneity, ; is negatively correlated
with the observed measure of LOCDEV and/or measurement error in this variable, ". If
it is, then when control for ; we should nd that the estimated coe¢ cient on LOCDEV
in the license income equation should fall (in absolute value), while its coe¢ cient in the
number of licenses equation should rise, as compared to the case where we do not control
for  . This is exactly what we nd. For license income, the estimated coe¢ cient (standard
error) on LOCDEV=High is -0.371 (.131) when we do not include the pre-sample patents
control for unobserved university heterogeneity, but it is -0.288 (.131) when we include the
control (column 5, Table 5). For the number of licenses, the coe¢ cient on LOCDEV=High
is 0.195 (.069) without the pre-sample control, compared to 0.288 (.074) with it (column
5, Table 6). These results indicate negative correlation between unobserved university
heterogeneity and either the survey measure of LOCDEV or measurement error in it.
However, our key empirical ndings do not change when we control for such correlation
using the pre-sample patents variable.
Another concern is that measurement error in our measure of local development objec-
tives may be correlated with observable covariates, in particular with whether the univer-
sity is located in a high-tech area. We would expect any such correlation to be negative,
since there is less reason to care about local development in developed, high-tech markets.
While our survey variable LOCDEV does not vary with our measure of high-tech density,
TechPole (see Table 2), this does not rule out correlation with the unobserved component
in local development preferences. In there is such negative correlation, we would get an
36To summarise these cases, let the true model be y = x +  + u where x is the true measure of
local development objectives (other covariates are surpressed here for simplicity), the observed measure
is xo = x+ " and we assume "x = "u = 0: The least sqaures estimate of ; say b; yields
p lim(b  ) =   
2
"
2xo
+
(x + ")
2xo
:
The rst term is the standard attenuation bias. The other term captures bias due to correlation between
the unobserved university heterogeneity (commercial orientation) and the true value and unobserved
component of local development objectives, which are both likely to be negative.
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upward bias in the coe¢ cient on TechPole in the license income equation, but a downward
bias on that coe¢ cient in the equation for the number of licenses.37 It is reassuring that
the estimated coe¢ cient on TechPole is of very similar magnitude in both equations (and
robust across regression specications), as a comparison of Tables 5 and 6 shows.
In summary, we conclude that our main empirical ndings cannot be explained away
by measurement errorin our survey measure of local development objectives.
5.5. Potential Bias Arising from Mismeasuring the Timing of Adoption of In-
centives
The current research design is not ideal for assessing the impact of incentive pay on
performance. Ideally, we would like to study how exogenous changes in the adoption
of incentive pay a¤ect performance. Because we do not have any information on when
universities adopted incentive pay, our identication comes from cross-sectional variation.
To account for possible correlation of the adoption decision with unobserved university
heterogeneity, we use the pre-sample patenting activity of the university as a control. If
we had information on when incentive pay was adopted, we could use this information to
look at the impact of adoption on subsequent changes in performance. But this approach
would be problematic too, since the adoption decision cannot be treated as an exogenous,
quasi-natural experiment (e.g., the adoption decision might be correlated with expected
future demand conditions that a¤ect the protability of using incentive pay). In the end,
one needs to model the timing of the decision to adopt incentive pay, and to have suitable
identifying variables that are correlated with adoption but uncorrelated with performance.
Because of data limitations, we are unable to take that approach in this paper.
However, we can show that the lack of information about the timing of adoption leads
us to underestimate the true e¤ect of incentives, once we control for unobserved university
heterogeneity. The intuition is simple: we estimate the e¤ect of incentives from the
di¤erence in the mean licensing performance for universities with incentive pay and those
without, controlling for other covariates. If universities which report having incentive
pay as of the survey date (2001) actually adopted it sometime after the beginning of our
sample period (1995), then we will mistakenly expect them to have had better licensing
37The reason is that the coe¢ cient on the observed variable LOCDEV (and thus presumably also the
unobserved component associated with it) is negative in the license income equation, but positive in the
equation for the number of licenses executed.
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performance throughout the sample. Since their pre-adoption performance will be worse
on average reecting the true absence of incentives we will understate the true impact
of adopting incentives. We present a formal derivation of this conclusion in Appendix 3.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates the impact of incentives, local development objectives, and gov-
ernment constraints on the e¤ectiveness of university technology licensing activity. The
analysis is based on new survey data on technology licensing o¢ ces, together with public
information on 86 U.S. universities for the period 1995-99. We develop a simple agency
model in which the university technology licensing o¢ ce pursues two objectives license
income and local development (interpreted as a preference for licensing in the local mar-
ket) and uses performance-related (merit and bonus) pay to incentivize workers. The
model predicts that local development objectives and government constraints make the
adoption of incentive pay less likely and reduce the level of income per license, and that
universities which adopt incentive pay generate more income per license. The empirical
results are generally consistent with the predictions of the model.
The key results are as follows. First, private ownership has a large, positive e¤ect on
the adoption of incentive pay, which is robust to controls for observed and unobserved
heterogeneity. In sharp contrast, private ownership has no independent e¤ect on licensing
performance, once we control for the adoption of incentive pay. Second, universities that
use bonus pay generate about 30-40 percent more income per license, controlling for uni-
versity 77heterogeneity. This nding shows that incentives can be important for improving
performance in both private and public institutions. Third, we nd that stronger local
development objectives and government constraints are costlyin terms of the foregone
license income. Universities with strong local development objectives generate about 30
percent less income per license, but at the same time, such universities are more likely to
license to an in-state (rather than out-of-state) startup company. This evidence on the
opportunity cost of local development objectives highlights the importance of comparing
the benets of local licensing preference to alternative policies, such as maximizing in-
come from university inventions and using the additional license income to nance local
economic development in other ways.
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Appendix 1. Nonparametric Results
We show here that nonparametric estimation methods (the propensity score matching
estimator) conrms the key parametric ndings in the text. The matching estimator com-
pares the licensing outcome of interest for universities that have introduced the treatment
of interest to those that have not.38 We study the e¤ects of three treatments adopting
incentives, having strong local development objectives, and being subject to strong gov-
ernment constraints. We use two outcome measures income per license and the number
of licenses per invention disclosure.
Let y1i denote the outcome measure of interest for university i when treatment is
applied and y0i when it is not, Di = 1 denotes university i getting the treatment, and
yi is the outcome actually observed. We want to estimate the average causal e¤ect of
treatment (on the treateduniversities), E(y1i jDi = 1) E(y0i jDi = 1); but E(y0i jDi = 1)
is not observed since we do not have information on the same university before and after
it introduces incentive pay. The matching estimator assumes that the selection of the
treated is random, conditional on observed university characteristics, and computes the
counterfactual outcome for university i as byi =Pj !ij(pi; pj)yj where j indexes the set of
universities in the control (untreated) group, pi and pj are the predicted probabilities that
universities i and j have the treatment based on their observed characteristics, and !ij is
a weighting metric that decreases with the distance between pi and pj. We experiment
with two di¤erent weighting metrics the nearest neighbor and kernel methods.
License Income
Panel A in Table 8 presents results on the impact of bonus pay (columns 1-4), local
development objectives (columns 5-8) and government constraints (columns 9-12) on the
mean of log income per active license for each university.39 Since the treatment must
be binary, for government constraints we analyze the di¤erence between universities that
report at least three (out a total of six) constraints as being important or very important,
and universities that do not. In each panel we use three alternative specications for the
38For an excellent review of the literature on these techniques, see Imbens (2004).
39Two points should be noted. First, in this analysis we drop the variable for merit pay (and focus only
on bonus pay) because the the parametric results showed that it did not signicantly a¤ect outcomes.
Second, we also experimented with alternative license outcome measures that relax the assumption of
constant returns to scale in the number of licenses we use log Income/(ActiveLicenses). Consistent
with the parametric estimates of  in Table 4, we use  = 0:8 and  = 1:2: The results are similar to
those reported in Panel A of Table 6.
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rst stage of the nonparametric estimation the set of controls is larger as we move to
the right in the panel (see table notes for details).
[See Table 8]
The nonparametric estimates of the impact of bonus pay on income per license are in
the range of 30 to 40 percent, and statistically signicant (bootstrapped standard errors
are reported). These estimates are very similar to the parametric estimates reported in
Table 5, and they are not sensitive to the controls used in the rst stage estimation.
We nd that strong local development objectives reduce income per license by about 45-
55 percent, and the estimates are again highly signicant. These nonparametric point
estimates are larger than the parametric estimates but they are not statistically di¤erent.
Finally, universities which are constrained(the treated group) generate about 30 percent
less income per license, on average. The estimates are robust to the controls in the rst
stage estimation, and statistically signicant when we use a wider set of controls. In the
subset of treated universities, the mean number of important constraints is 3.9; for the
untreated, the mean is 0.81. Thus the nonparametric estimate corresponds to the impact
of increasing the number of constraints by 3.09. The implied marginal e¤ect of a constraint
is  0:33=3:09 =  0:11, which is similar to the parametric estimate of -0.17 in Table 5.
Number of Licenses
Panel B summarises results for the mean number of licenses executed per invention
disclosed.40 Bonus pay has a statistically signicant, positive impact on the number of
licenses per invention, about 13 percent. This di¤ers from the parametric estimation
where we found no signicant e¤ect of incentives. However, the nonparametric estimates
conrm that the e¤ect of incentives on income per license (the quality of licenses) is
about three times larger than on the quantityof licenses (compare columns 1-4 in Panels
A and B). This is consistent with our argument that monitoring performance on the
quality of licenses is harder than on the quantity, and thus incentives are more important
and e¤ective for quality outcomes. Next, we nd that local development objectives do
not have any material impact on the number of licenses per invention. This is di¤erent
from our ndings with parametric estimation, where there was positive and statistically
signicant e¤ect. Given the sensitivity of the nding to the estimation procedure, we
40We also tried an alternative outcome measures that relax the assumption of constant returns to scale
in the number of inventions. We use log Number Licenses(InventionsDisclosed) , for  = 0:8 as indicated
by the parametric estimates in Table 5. Results are similar to those reported in Panel B of Table 6.
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cannot draw any denite conclusion from theses data on how local development objectives
a¤ect the number of licenses. Finally, as with parametric estimation, we nd no e¤ect of
government constraints on the number of licenses.
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Appendix 2. Pre-Sample Patent Information and
Unobserved Heterogeneity41
The model is
yit = xit + i + uit
where i = 1; :::; N; t = 1; :::; T; y is the logarithm of license income, x includes both time
varying and invariant regressors (the latter includes the survey measures of the use of
incentive pay, local development objectives, and government constraints), and we only
assume E(uitjxit; xit 1; :::; i) = 0 for all t: The unobserved heterogeneity i may be cor-
related with incentive pay and other variables. We use the pre-sample scaling method
developed by Blundell, Gri¢ th and van Reenen (1999), which amounts to constructing a
su¢ cient statistic for i based on pre-sample information on the dependent variable and
then directly controlling for it in the regression.42 They develop the method for a (non-
linear) patent count model. Below we sketch how the method works in our context and
how we must adapt it for our purposes.
Let J denote the number of pre-sample observations. Then
p lim
 
1
J + 1
 JX
t=0
yit
!
= p lim
 
1
J + 1
 JX
t=0
(xit + i + uit)
!
= p lim
J!1
 
1
J + 1
 JX
t=0
xit
!
+ i
The left-hand-side of this equation is the limit of the pre-sample mean of license income
for university i:
Using a linear projection argument, we can express each of the observable regressors
xj as a linear function of the unobservable i and an error cijt uncorrelated with i :
xijt = 0 + ji + cijt; j = 1; : : : ; k
with E(cijt) = 0 and E(icijt) = 0:
Note that if all the 0js are zero then there is no endogeneity problem. Thus, if xijt is
endogenous at least one of the js is non-zero. We assume that the projection parameters
41This appendix is taken from Lach and Schankerman (2007). It is included here for completeness and
for the convenience of the referee..
42They also show that one can use pre-sample information on the regressors, but we do not have such
information.
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are constant over time.43 This representation implies
1
J + 1
 JX
t=0
xit =
1
J + 1
 JX
t=0
kX
j=1
xijt
= 0
kX
j=1
j + i
 
kX
j=1
jj
!
+
1
J + 1
 JX
t=0
kX
j=1
cijtj
Provided a law of large numbers apply to 1
J+1
P J
t=0 cijt so that p lim
J!1
1
J+1
P J
t=0 cijt = 0, we
get
p lim
J!1
1
J + 1
 JX
t=0
xit = 0
kX
j=1
j + 1i + p lim
J!1
1
J + 1
 JX
t=0
cijtj
= 0
kX
j=1
j + 1i
where 1 =
Pk
j=1 jj:
44
We can then write
myi  p lim
J!1
 
1
J + 1
 JX
t=0
yit
!
= 0
kX
j=1
j + (1 + 1) i
and solving for i;
i =  
0
Pk
j=1 j
1 + 1
+
1
1 + 1
myi
This equation says that the pre-sample mean of log license income is a su¢ cient statistic
for i: Substituting into the original model we get the estimating equation
yit = xit +
1
1 + 1
myi + uit
where the constant term  0
Pk
j=1 j
1+1
is absorbed into the constant term of the original
model. In the actual estimation the pre-sample mean of y is used instead of its probability
limit myi:
The problem in our context is that we do not have pre-sample information on license
income. However, we do have pre-sample information on the patenting activity for each
43This assumption is made to simplify the exposition and it will hold if the x0s are drawn from the
same distribution at every t: The method can be extended to time-varying coe¢ cients under an additional
convergence assumption.
44Note that there are no time-invariant components in cijt they are captured by i and that some
weak serial dependency is possible as long as a law of large numbers can be applied.
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university. In order to use pre-sample patents instead of pre-sample license income we
make the additional assumption that patenting is also a linear function of the unobserved
heterogeneity, : That is, we assume
pit = zit+ i + vit
where p is the log of patents (or patent citations) and the regressors z may have com-
mon components with x: Since the decision by the TLO to patent an invention is based
on expected returns from commercialising the invention, this assumption that patenting
depends on  seems very reasonable.
Retracing the previous steps but using p instead of y; using tildes to denote coe¢ cients
in this derivation for patents, and letting mpi = p lim
J!1
1
J+1
P J
t=0 pit; we have
i =  
e0Pkj=1 j
 + e1 + 1 + e1mpi
and substituting into the original model, we get the estimable equation
yit = xit +
1
 + e1mpi + uit
where the constant term   e0Pkj=1 j
+e1 is absorbed into the constant term of the original
model.
This is the equation we estimate in the paper, using the pre-sample mean of patents
(or patent citations) instead of its probability limit mpi to control for the correlation with
unobserved heterogeneity.
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Appendix 3. Bias from Mismeasuring the Timing of
Adoption of Incentives
In this appendix we show that any mismeasurement in the timing of adoption of
incentives leads us to underestimate the true e¤ect of incentives on performance. For
simplicity, and to highlight the intuition, we focus on the incentives variable and ignore
other observable covariates. We can introduce them, but at the cost of considerable
complexity.
We write the true model as
yit = + Di + i + uit
where Di = 1 if university i has adopted incentive pay, i denotes unobserved university
heterogeneity, E(uit j Di) = 0 and E(i j Di) 6= 0: The latter covariance introduces
endogeneity bias, discussed in Appendix 2. We include it here for completeness.
We know whether the university adopted incentive pay as of the date of the survey,
2001, but not the date of adoption. We assume that universities do not revert (during
the sample period) once they have adopted incentive pay. Let G0 denote the set of N0
universities for which Di = 0; and G1 denote the set of N1 universities for which Di = 1
(we denote N = N0+N1): Let G11 denote the subset of N11 universities in G1 that adopted
incentive pay prior to the sample period, and G10 denote the subset of N10 universities in
G1 that adopted incentive pay at some point during the sample period (1995-1999). We
do not know which universities fall into the subsets G10 and G11 i.e. we do not observe
when universities adopted incentive pay. To begin, we assume that these N10 universities
had the same incentive pay they reported in 2001 for the whole sample period, 1995-99,
but later will show what happens if we relax this assumption.
The estimated coe¢ cient on the dummy variable D can be written as the di¤erence
between the mean of the dependent variable (over i and t) for universities with D = 1 and
those with D = 0; say y1:and y0::, respectively. Writing these out,
y0: =
1
TN0
TX
t=1
X
i2G0
(+ i + uit) = + 0: + u0:
where 0: and u0: denote the means of unobserved heterogeneity and the disturbance for
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all universities in G0: Similarly,
y1: =
1
TN1
TX
t=1
f
X
i2G10
(+ i + uit) +
X
i2G11
(+  + i + uit)g
= +
N11
N1
 +
N10
N1
10: +
N11
N1
11: +
N10
N1
u10: +
N11
N1
u11:
where 10: (respectively, 11:) is the mean value of  for universities that adopted incentive
pay during the sample period (respectively, before the sample period), and similarly for
u10: and u11: The term involving  represents the fact that universities adopting incentives
before the sample should have a higher value of y than universities adopting at the end of
the sample. The estimated e¤ect of incentive pay is b = y = y1:   y0:: Thus
p lim
N
(b  ) =  N10
N1
 +

N10
N1
10: +
N11
N1
11:   0:

The rst term in this equation is the bias due to mismeasuring when universities
adopt incentive pay. The important conclusion is that we underestimate ; and the bias
depends on the fraction of universities with D = 1 that adopted incentive pay during the
sample period rather than at the end as we assume. In addition, there is a second bias
due to correlation between the adoption decision and : This is the endogeniety bias we
discussed at length in the text. It captures the di¤erence between the mean xed-e¤ect
of adopters and non-adopters, which we assume to be positive (i.e., 11 > 10 > 0 as
more commercially oriented universities adopt earlier). Once we control for unobserved
heterogeneity, this endogeneity bias should disappear.
Finally, we can show that the bias due to mismeasurment of adoption timing is smaller
(but still negative) when we relax the assumption that in-sample adoption is made at the
end of the sample by all N10 universities. Letting ti  T denote the adoption date for
university i; the equation for y1: becomes
y1: =
1P
i2G10 (T   ti ) + TN11
8<:X
i2G10
TX
t=ti
(+ i + uit) +
X
i2G11
TX
t=1
(+  + i + uit)
9=;
= +
TN11P
i2G10 (T   ti ) + TN11

+
1P
i2G10 (T   ti ) + TN11
(X
i2G10
(T   ti ) 10: + TN1111: +
X
i2G10
(T   ti )u10: + TN11u11:
)
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Using this equation, the expression for the bias is
p lim
N
(b  ) =  
P
i2G10 (T   ti )P
i2G10 (T   ti ) + TN11

+
 P
i2G10 (T   ti )P
i2G10 (T   ti ) + TN11
10: +
TN11P
i2G10 (T   ti ) + TN11
11:   0:

This bias reduces to the earlier case we analysed when ti = 0 for all i: It is easy to see
that the negative bias from the mismeasurement of the timing of adoption is smaller (in
absolute value) when ti > 0 for some i: Also note that the positive, endogeneity bias is
also smaller than the previous case because 10: < 11: and
N11
N1
< TN11P
i2G10(T t

i )+TN11
:
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Variable Mean Median Standard deviation Min Max
Licensing income, '000 5686 1289 14362 0 148938
Licenses executed 29.1 16 33.9 0 218
Inventions disclosed 87.7 66 78.4 0 476
Licensing income per 
active license 38.9 15.6 143.2 2.9 1327
Licenses executed per 
invention disclosed 5.2 3.5 5.5 0.31 27.6
Full-time TLO 
employees 6.8 4.8 5.9 0.5 27.7
TLO age 12 9 13.3 1 71
TechPole 1.7 0.38 3.19 0.001 23.7
Total Startups 2.8 2 3.74 0 31
University Startups 2.5 1 3.47 0 25
Pre-sample patents 
stock 169.1 65 326.8 0 2492
Dummy for Private 0.28 0 0.45 0 1
Dummy for Merit Pay 0.41 0 0.49 0 1
Dummy for Bonus Pay 0.17 0 0.38 0 1
Dummy for 
LOCDEV=Medium 0.43 0 0.49 0 1
Dummy for 
LOCDEV=High 0.34 0 0.48 0 1
NumConst 1.5 1 1.6 0 6
Dummy for MedSchool 0.66 1 0.48 0 1
Note: monetary values are in thousands of 1996 US dollars. 
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for main variables
LOCDEV measures the weight the university attaches to local/regional development objectives in its licensing 
activity. NumConst is the number of state government constraints that the university reports as being moderately 
or very important (based on six different constraints listed in the survey).
Variable Number of universities
Dummy for 
Private
Full-time TLO 
employees TechPole
Incentives
No incentives 36 0.14 4.70 1.23
Merit pay 35 0.37 6.90 1.14
Bonus pay 15 0.40 9.60 3.53
Local objectives
LOCDEV=Low 20 0.45 5.82 1.62
LOCDEV=Medium 37 0.30 7.19 1.64
LOCDEV=High 29 0.14 6.06 1.52
Gov't constraints
NumConst<3 66 0.36 7.40 1.64
NumConst≥3 20 0.00 3.60 1.44
Table 2
Incentives, Local Development Objectives and Government Constraints
LOCDEV measures the weight the university attaches to local/regional development objectives in its 
licensing activity. NumConst is the number of state government constraints that the university reports as 
being moderately or very important (based on six different constraints listed in the survey). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dummy for Private 0.812*** 0.935*** 0.851** 0.641
(0.0331) (0.373) (0.404) (0.437)
Dummy for 
LOCDEV=Medium -0.285 -0.360
(0.393) (0.392)
Dummy for 
LOCDEV=High 0.148 0.043
(0.399) (0.408)
NumConst -0.141 -0.215**
(0.113) (0.102)
TechPole 0.003 -0.035 -0.022 0.014
(0.055) (0.053) (0.061) (0.065)
Dummy for MedSchool 0.381 0.132 0.077 0.029
(0.371) (0.400) (0.415) (0.412)
Technology area faculty 
shares Yes*** Yes** Yes* Yes*
(F=15.78) (F=11.22) (F=10.58) (F=10.06)
Pre-sample patents stock 0.249** 0.254** 0.252**
(0.109) (0.110) (0.108)
Dummy for Canada -0.305 0.005 0.056 -0.027
(0.555) (0.597) (0.564) (0.525)
Pseudo R2 0.055 0.182 0.231 0.253 0.237
LOCDEV measures the weight the university attaches to local/regional development objectives in its 
licensing activity. NumConst is the number of state government constraints that the university reports as 
being moderately or very important (based on six different constraints listed in the survey). 
Table 3
The determinants of adoption of high-powered incentives
Dependent variable: Dummy for Performance-Based Pay, Probit estimation (86 universities)
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and serial correlation. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
License 
income
Number of 
licenses
Total 
startups
Local 
startups
Performance-Based Pay Positive Positive Zero Zero
Local Objectives Negative Positive Zero Positive
Constraints Negative Zero Negative Zero
Table 4
Econometric predictions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
log(active licenses) 1.256*** 1.184*** 1.028*** 0.917*** 0.959*** 1.028*** 1.012*** 0.760*** 0.725***
(0.038) (0.042) (0.052) (0.057) (0.058) (0.054) (0.058) (0.064) (0.065)
Dummy for Private 0.315*** 0.161 0.094 0.156 0.077 0.015 0.212 0.117 0.299*
(0.103) (0.108) (0.146) (0.144) (0.142) (0.145) (0.157) (0.142) (0.154)
Dummy for Merit Pay 0.324*** -0.022 -0.111 -0.079 0.069 -0.011 0.037 -0.016
(0.089) (0.109) (0.118) (0.117) (0.109) (0.123) (0.118) (0.166)
Dummy for Bonus Pay 0.778*** 0.401*** 0.304** 0.274** 0.380*** 0.468*** 0.493*** 0.495***
(0.126) (0.128) (0.139) (0.139) (0.132) (0.155) (0.131) (0.161)
Dummy for 
LOCDEV=Medium 0.005 -0.004 -0.145 -0.170 0.073
(0.117) (0.122) (0.131) (0.117) (0.137)
Dummy for 
LOCDEV=High -0.288** -0.371*** -0.317*** -0.261** 0.015
(0.131) (0.131) (0.133) (0.119) (0.159)
NumConst -0.171*** -0.061 -0.231***
(0.058) (0.051) (0.082)
NumConst x Univ 
Intervene 0.279*** 0.195*** 0.317***
(0.046) (0.042) (0.078)
Pre-sample patents stock 0.159*** 0.120*** 0.088** 0.049 -0.034
(0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.044)
Dummy for MedSchool 0.803*** 0.645*** 0.587*** 0.717*** 0.712*** 0.481*** 0.771***
(0.109) (0.115) (0.112) (0.110) (0.116) (0.105) (0.143)
TechPole 0.049*** 0.037** 0.041*** 0.053*** 0.026 0.033*** 0.044***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017)
Technology area faculty shares Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
(F=21.64) (F=19.69) (F=21.79) (F=21.09) (F=23.05) (F=22.71) (F=27.16)
log(inventions disclosed) 0.549***
(0.073)
Pre log(licensing income) 0.352***
(0.067)
Dummy for Canada -0.355 -0.288 -0.609** -0.463 -0.463 -0.561* -0.523* -0.297 0.099
(0.248) (0.256) (0.299) (0.308) (0.317) (0.315) (0.305) (0.291) (0.211)
Number of universities 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 66
Number of observations 518 518 518 518 518 518 518 518 422
LOCDEV measures the weight the university attaches to local/regional development objectives in its licensing activity. NumConst is the number of state government 
constraints that the university reports as being moderately or very important (based on six different constraints listed in the survey). 'Univ Intervene' is a dummy that receives 
the value of 1 if the TLO says that the university 'usually' or 'always' intervenes in the decision-making of the TLO. Pre log(licensing income) is computed over the period 
1991-1995 for 66 universities for which such information exists.
Table 5
The effect of incentives, objectives and constraints on licensing income
Dependent variable: log(licensing income), GLS estimation
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and serial correlation (GLS estimation with heteroskedasticity between panels and AR(1) serial 
correlation within panels). *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. All regressions include a complete set of year dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(inventions disclosed) 0.855*** 0.849*** 0.838*** 0.754*** 0.744*** 0.800*** 0.756*** 0.583***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.031) (0.039) (0.039) (0.030) (0.039) (0.054)
Dummy for Private 0.089 0.072 -0.039 -0.101 -0.042 0.072 0.017 0.027
(0.059) (0.065) (0.068) (0.069) (0.071) (0.068) (0.075) (0.070)
Dummy for Merit Pay 0.023 0.058 0.039 0.023 0.044 0.055 0.113
(0.069) (0.075) (0.073) (0.073) (0.070) (0.075) (0.080)
Dummy for Bonus Pay 0.136* 0.123 0.069 0.068 0.098 0.113 0.235***
(0.078) (0.079) (0.079) (0.078) (0.075) (0.081) (0.081)
Dummy for 
LOCDEV=Medium 0.127* 0.025 0.117* 0.110*
(0.068) (0.065) (0.068) (0.069)
Dummy for 
LOCDEV=High 0.288*** 0.195*** 0.282*** 0.233***
(0.074) (0.069) (0.073) (0.078)
NumConst 0.038 -0.018
(0.033) (0.039)
NumConst x Univ 
Intervene 0.007 0.059
(0.031) (0.038)
Pre-sample patents stock 0.088*** 0.098*** 0.096*** -0.029
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.029)
Dummy for MedSchool -0.091 -0.120* -0.129** -0.096 -0.116* -0.071*
(0.067) (0.069) (0.067) (0.065) (0.068) (0.078)
TechPole 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.032*** 0.014***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Technology area faculty shares Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
(F=41.95) (F=38.56) (F=40.75) (F=50.51) (F=43.53) (F=22.11)
Pre log(licenses executed) 1.039***
(0.146)
Dummy for Canada -0.089 -0.100 -0.443*** -0.239 -0.324* -0.501*** -0.163 0.121
(0.119) (0.118) (0.175) (0.176) (0.180) (0.185) (0.193) (0.146)
Number of universities 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 66
Number of observations 518 518 518 518 518 518 518 422
LOCDEV measures the weight the university attaches to local/regional development objectives in its licensing activity. NumConst is the 
number of state government constraints that the university reports as being moderately or very important (based on six different constraints 
listed in the survey). 'Univ Intervene' is a dummy that receives the value of 1 if the TLO says that the university 'usually' or 'always' 
intervenes in the decision-making of the TLO. Pre log(licenses executed) is computed over the period 1991-1995 for 66 universities for 
which such information exists.
Table 6
The effect of incentives, objectives and constraints on number of licenses executed
Dependent variable: log(licenses executed), GLS estimation
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and serial correlation (GLS estimation with heteroskedasticity between 
panels and AR(1) serial correlation within panels). *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
All regressions include a complete set of year dummies. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(inventions disclosed) 0.667*** 0.655*** 0.649*** 0.512*** 0.534*** 0.571***
(0.103) (0.102) (0.092) (0.071) (0.074) (0.083)
log(licenses executed) 0.249*** 0.247*** 0.238***
(0.078) (0.079) (0.073)
Total Startups 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.105***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022)
Dummy for Private -0.105 -0.107 -0.210** -0.326*** -0.322*** -0.378***
(0.120) (0.118) (0.104) (0.081) (0.080) (0.098)
Dummy for Merit Pay -0.034 -0.039 0.068 0.035 0.045 0.043
(0.127) (0.129) (0.119) (0.092) (0.092) (0.096)
Dummy for Bonus Pay -0.186 -0.192 -0.154 0.012 0.024 -0.093
(0.155) (0.159) (0.138) (0.090) (0.091) (0.110)
Dummy for 
LOCDEV=Medium -0.150 -0.147 -0.166 0.177 0.176* 0.173*
(0.169) (0.165) (0.125) (0.106) (0.105) (0.104)
Dummy for 
LOCDEV=High -0.007 -0.003 -0.096 0.233** 0.232** 0.200**
(0.176) (0.172) (0.126) (0.122) (0.123) (0.110)
NumConst -0.132*** -0.128** -0.149*** -0.044 -0.049 -0.042
(0.054) (0.057) (0.054) (0.049) (0.049) (0.053)
NumConst x Univ 
Intervene 0.067 0.065 0.073 0.006 0.009 0.003
(0.052) (0.053) (0.054) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049)
Pre-sample patents stock 0.128 -0.011 -0.023 -0.033
(0.041) (0.036) (0.026) (0.027)
Dummy for MedSchool -0.148 0.033
(0.103) (0.091)
TechPole 0.031*** 0.016
(0.010) (0.010)
Technology area faculty shares Yes* Yes
(F=9.62) (F=5.47)
Number of universities 86 86 86 86 86 86
Number of observations 518 518 518 518 518 518
LOCDEV measures the weight the university attaches to local/regional development objectives in its licensing 
activity. NumConst is the number of state government constraints that the university reports as being moderately 
or very important (based on six d
Table 7
The effect of incentives, objectives and constraints on number of licenses executed
Dependent variable: Total Startups and Local Startups, Negative Binomial estimation
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and serial correlation (GLS estimation with 
heteroskedasticity between panels and AR(1) serial correlation within panels). *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10.
Total Startups Local Startups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dummy for Bonus Pay 0.432** 0.386** 0.138* 0.118*
(0.159) (0.099) (0.058) (0.059)
Obs=0 71 71 71 71
Obs=1 15 15 15 15
Dummy for 
LOCDEV=High -0.548** -0.421** 0.065 0.038
(0.275) (0.256) (0.055) (0.060)
Obs=0 57 57 57 57
Obs=1 29 29 29 29
Dummy for 
NumConst≥3 -0.335 -0.341* -0.045 -0.038
(0.195) (0.161) (0.059) (0.046)
Obs=0 20 20 20 20
Obs=1 66 66 66 66
Weighting method Kernel 
Nearest-
neighbour Kernel 
Nearest-
neighbour Kernel 
Nearest-
neighbour Kernel 
Nearest-
neighbour Kernel 
Nearest-
neighbour Kernel 
Nearest-
neighbour
Table 8
Non-parametric propensity-score estimation: 86 Universities
Bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
Obs=1 is the number of observations for which the "treatment" applies (e.g., the universities that have bonus pay). Obs=0 is the number of observations for the "untreated" 
universities. In the second stage, observations are weighed using the kernel method.
The first stage regression for the Dummy for Bonus Pay is as reported in column 2 of Table 2. Analogous specifications are used for Dummy for LOCDEV=High and Dummy for 
NumConst≥3. That is, for LOCDEV=High, we include the bonus pay dummy and delete the LOCDEV dummies; for NumConst≥3, we include the bonus pay dummy and delete the 
NumConst variable. 
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